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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

t

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

$

MARY SEAMSTER,

t

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 880373-CA

Category No. 2

:

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Should this Court grant rehearing to modify the
memorandum decision in this case to reflect the statutory
requirement that it was the duty of the Utah County Attorney to
represent the State and of the American Fork City Attorney to
represent American Fork City in this case and not of the Attorney
General?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant pled guilty in the Circuit Court to two
separate drunk driving charges (R. Vol. I at 37, R. Vol. II at
32).

Circuit Court case number 88-CR-186 was filed by the Utah

County Attorney charging defendant with drunk driving under state
law.

Circuit Court case number 881000106 was filed by the

American Fork City Attorney charging defendant with drunk driving
under city ordinance.

The cases were heard together by Judge

John Backlund# however, there is no order formally consolidating
the cases.

Defendant was sentenced to serve consecutive 20 day

sentences on each conviction (R. Vol. I at 13).
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Defendant appealed to this Court complaining that she
should not have been sentenced consecutively.

The notices of

appeal contain both lower court case numbers and both were served
only on the Utah County Attorney (R. Vol. I at 8, R. Vol. II at
6).

The circuit court clerk transmitted two separate volumes of

pleadings, one for each lower court case, however, this has been
treated as one appeal.
Defendant filed her brief on November 4, 1988.

The

respondent's brief was due on December 4, 1988. When no
respondent's brief was filed on that date# this Court sent a
letter addressed to defendant-appellant's attorney, Gary H.
Weight, with copies to Sherry Ragan (Deputy Utah County Attorney)
and to the Attorney General stating that the respondent must file
a brief by December 30, 1988.

See Appendix A.

No respondent's

brief was filed and this Court issued its memorandum decision
affirming defendant's sentences on January 26, 1989.

See

Appendix B.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
All relevant facts are contained in the Statement of
the Case above or elsewhere in the body of this petition.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should grant rehearing to modify its
decision in this case to delete the reprimand of the Attorney
General for failing to file a brief because there is a specific
statute requiring the county attorney and the city attorney to
file briefs in this case.

Moreover, a review of this Court's

file reveals that the Attorney General, even in a supervisory
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capacity, could not have known that there was a failure on the
part of the county attorney to pursue this appeal.
ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court outlined the bases for granting
a petition for rehearing in Cumminqs v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157,
172-3, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913):
When this court . . . has considered and
decided all of the material questions
involved in a case, a rehearing should not be
applied for, unless we have misconstrued or
overlooked some material fact or facts, or
have overlooked some statute or decision
which may affect the result, or that we have
based the decision on some wrong principle of
law, or have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the
result. . . . If there are some reasons . . .
such as we have indicated above, or other
good reasons, a petition for a rehearing
should be promptly filed and, if it is
meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.
Under this standard, the State is entitled to a rehearing for the
purpose of modifying the second paragraph of this Court's
memorandum decision which overlooks material facts and relevant
statutes, or for the other good reasons more specifically
outlined below.
The second paragraph of this Court's decision states:
Respondent State of Utah did not file any
brief in this matter, either by the Attorney
General, its attorney under Utah Code Ann. S
67-5-1 (1988), or by the Utah County
Attorney. It is unfortunate that the State's
neglect in this and other matters prevents
this Court from the benefit of a thoughtful,
reasoned response by respondent to
appellant's views.
State v. Seamster# case no. 880373-CA, slip op. at 1 (filed Jan.
26, 1989) (copy in Appendix B).

The State does not dispute that
-3-

no respondent's brief was filed in this case nor does it dispute
that briefing from both parties is beneficial to this Court.

The

State does disagree, however, that it was the Attorney General's
duty to file the respondent's brief.
Utah Code Ann. S 67-5-1 (1988), cited in Seamster,
provides that "The attorney general shall: (1) attend the . . .
Court of Appeals . . . and prosecute or defend all causes to
which the state . . . is a party . . . ."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-

11 (1987) more specifically provides, on the other hand, that
The county attorney shall represent the
interests of the state as public prosecutor
in any criminal appeals from the circuit
court. City attorneys shall represent the
interests of municipalities in any appeals
from circuit courts involving violations of
municipal ordinances.
Because the general rule of statutory construction is that when
two statutes conflict, the more specific provision governs over
the more general provision, Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply
Co., 681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984), S 78-4-11 governs over § 675-1.

It was, therefore, the duty of the county attorney and of

the city attorney to file a respondent's brief in this case.
It may be argued that the Attorney General in his
supervisory capacity over county attorneys, see § 67-5-1(5),
should have acted when notified that the respondent's brief had
not been filed.

The Attorney General was provided with a copy of

this Court's default letter dated December 19, 1988 stating that
the respondent's brief had not been filed.

See Appendix A.

Close inspection of that letter, however, reveals that inaction
was understandable.
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Because this was a case normally handled by the county
attorney, the Attorney General was not served with most of the
documents filed by the appellant.

The Attorney General/

therefore/ had no file on this case and no way of tracking the
case.

Unaware that defense counsel had filed appellant's brief/

when the Attorney General received the default letter addressed
to Gary H. Weight notifying him that a respondent's brief must be
filed by Dec. 30/ 1988/ the Attorney General understandably
assumed that use of the word respondent was inadvertent and this
was merely a courtesy copy informing this office that defense
counsel had not filed his brief and that no action was required
of the Attorney General.
This Court's file contains several documents filed by
defense counsel on appeal.

Of those documents/ only the

docketing statement indicates that it was served on the Attorney
General on June 24/ 1988. Given that it was also served on the
Utah County Attorney and that this office could determine from
the face of the document that it was not involved in the appeal/
the document was not retained/ if it was ever received.

Other

than the default letter/ none of the Court's correspondence was
sent to the Attorney General either.

Thus# this office

maintained no file or other record of this appeal and had no way
of knowing that this Court's default letter was incorrectly
addressed to defense counsel instead of the prosecutor.
This Court's reprimand is unfair because the Court was
unaware of these facts and the State requests that the decision
be modified to reflect that the county attorney and the city

5

attorney were the proper representatives of the governmental
entities involved.

The Court should also consider that defense

counsel never served the American Fork City Attorney with any of
the appeal pleadings, including the notice of appeal.

It is

understandable, therefore, that the city did not respond to the
appeal.
It may be claimed that a rehearing is not necessary in
this case because the State's grounds for the petition do not
affect defendant's sentences, her sole grounds for appeal.

See

Cummings, 42 Utah at 172-3, 129 P. at 624 (rehearing should not
be applied for unless it affects the result).

The State's

grounds do affect the result of the case, neverthelessf because,
if the petition is granted by this Court, the decision will no
longer contain a reprimand of the Attorney General and will
define which office is responsible for filing respondent's briefs
in circuit court appeals to this Court.
If this Court denies the petition for rehearing, the
State alternatively requests that this Court consider this
petition as a motion to modify its decision to delete the
reprimand of the Attorney General for failure to file a brief.
If allowed to stand, the decision impacts the reputation of this
office and is unfair where the Attorney General had no duty to
file a brief and, even if he had a supervisory duty, could not
have known that the State was in default from the letter he
received from this Court.

_£_

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to rehear this case for the purpose of modifying that portion of
the decision that reprimands the Attorney General for failing to
file a respondent's brief.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

f$t

day of February,

1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

SANDRA L.
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Gary H. Weight, attorney for defendant, 43 East 200 North,
P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 84603, this /ST
1989.
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Gary H. Weight/
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Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
43 East 200 North
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In Re:
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

No. 880373-CA

Mary Seamster,
Defendant and Appellant.
Dear Mr. Weight:
Our records indicate that the respondents brief in this
case was due December 4, 1988 and has not been filed.
Unless the respondent's brief and seven copies is filed by
December 30, 1988, the matter will be submitted to the Court on
the appellant's brief only.
Sincerely,

Kathleen Hopkinson
Case Manager
cc:

Sherry Ragan
David Wilkinson
Attorney General
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State of Utah,

AmMC/'crj,,'

Plaintiff and Respondent,

u

*- M i. . » •

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

v.
Case No. 880373-CA
Mary Seamster,
Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Bench, Davidson and Jackson.

PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals her sentence upon conviction of two
separate drunk driving charges. At sentencing, the trial court
imposed a separate jail term for each offense, in addition to
certain other penalties. The two jail terms were ordered to
run consecutively. Defendant appealed, challenging the
statutory authority to impose consecutive sanctions for
misdemeanor violations.
Respondent State of Utah did not file any brief in this
matter, either by the Attorney General, its attorney under Utah
Code Ann. § 67-5-1 (19&8), or by the Utah County Attorney. It
is unfortunate that the State's neglect in this and other
matters prevents this Court from the benefit of a thoughtful,
reasoned response by respondent to appellant's views.
Defendant complains that, under Utah Code Ann.
S 76-3-401(1) (1978), a trial court has no power to impose
consecutive sentences for misdemeanor convictions. Defendant
contends that by permitting the imposition of consecutive
sentences in felony cases, the statute necessarily excludes the
power to impose such consecutive sentences in misdemeanor
cases. Biil &££ Utah Code Ann., S 76-3-401(3) (1978) ("A court
may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode. • . . * ) .

The problem with defendant's contention is that it was
never raised in the trial court, at sentencing or afterward.
In fact, in a discussion at sentencing, defense counsel argued
that a concurrent term would be adequate punishment but
concurred that consecutive sentences were within the judge's
discretion.

The Court:
. . . I don't give concurrent sentences for separate
offenses.

Mr, weight:
I—well, if that's a policy of the Court, I don't know how
to address it, your Honor. I know that the statute is
there and it allows the Court the discretion to consider
concurrent as opposed to consecutive sentences.

The Court:
. . . On a misdemeanor, the Court can impose consecutive
sentences on multiple counts in the same Information, but
these—these were two entirely separate occurrences.
Hr, weight:
I understand that.
The Court:
And that's why I'm saying that's my position not to give
concurrent sentences for separate offenses.
Hr. weight:
Well, I suppose the only way I could address that, your
Honor, is to plead to the Court to allow 15-day sentences
on each, and run them concurrent.

And I—I don't know what I could do to persuade the Court
otherwise; . . .
Counsel failed to raise in the trial court the issue now on
appeal. No objection was ever interposed to the consecutive
nature of the sentences because the statute did not allow such
a sentence in misdemeanor cases.
Having failed to preserve the issue on appeal by first
bringing an articulated, specific objection to the sentence to

ftOA191-^ft

the attention ol the trial court, defendant is precluded from
arguing the issue on appeal. Thomas v. State. 664 P.2d 1069
(Okl. Cr. 1983). £fi£ also State v. O'Brien. 721 P.2d 896,
899-900 (Utah 19B6).
1
ALL CONCUR:

880373-CA
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